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DETAINEE TRANSFERS AND IMMIGRATION
JUDGES: ICE FORUM-SHOPPING TACTICS
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Roger C. Grantham, Jr.
U.S. immigration policy and ICE tactics have been greatly
scrutinized over the past year. While many criticisms focus on border
policy and the conditions of detention, scholars have also raised
concerns over ICE’s unfettered discretion to transfer detainees to
different detention centers. Not only may ICE transfer detainees
anywhere in the country, ICE has gradually expanded this practice.
Now, on average, every detainee is transferred at least once each
year. ICE, however, is not the sole point of criticism for immigration
advocates. Recently, Immigration Judges’ decisions have been
scrutinized for their lack of consistency. Wide variations in IJ
decision making indicates that the judge assigned to a case heavily
influences the likelihood of a favorable outcome to ICE. The
intersection of these two distinct problems—immigration detainee
transfers and inconsistent IJ decisions—effectively allows ICE to
forum shop by transferring detainees to detention centers with IJs
who are likely to issue rulings favorable to ICE. This amounts to a
crisis of justice, as ICE may transform facially neutral proceedings
into judicial rubber stamping for the case outcomes ICE desires.



J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A. Philosophy, History, 2016,
University of Georgia. I am grateful to Professor Jason Cade and Amy Helmick for their
guidance in writing this note. I would also like to thank the editors of the Georgia Law
Review for their helpful criticisms and recommendations.
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INTRODUCTION

Ruben Lima-Diaz has continuously lived in the United States for
twenty-one years since he entered the country from his native
Mexico when he was three years old.1 On more than one occasion
during those two decades, Lima-Diaz had run-ins with the law.2
After Lima-Diaz was first arrested for possession of marijuana in
2012, he was detained pursuant to removal proceedings by
Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”). 3 In less than three
weeks, ICE released him after deciding to close his case.4 This would
not be Lima-Diaz’s last encounter with ICE.
Four years later, Lima-Diaz was arrested for a DUI and ICE
reinstated removal proceedings against him.5 He was detained at
Stewart Detention Center—one of four ICE detention facilities in
Georgia and the second largest facility in the country6—in the small,
rural town of Lumpkin, Georgia.7 After being detained for two
months and managing to secure counsel, an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) released Lima-Diaz on a $2,000 bond on Christmas Eve of
2016.8 ICE did not appeal this grant of bond to the Board of
Immigration Appeals.9
Here is where the story gets more interesting. After Lima-Diaz
had been free on bond for over four months, ICE agents rearrested
and detained him during a routine check-in with his probation

1 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4, Lima-Diaz v. Gallagher, No. 7:17-cv-131 (M.D.
Ga. July 18, 2017).
2 Respondent’s Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2–3, Lima-Diaz v.
Gallagher, No. 7:17-cv-131 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2017) (indicating arrests for misdemeanor
possession of marijuana, tattooing a minor, driving without a license, and DUI).
3 Id. at 3.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Where Are Immigrants with Immigration Court Cases Being Detained?, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (Mar. 29, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/504 (last visited Aug.
15, 2018) (“Los Angeles County, California with its Mira Loma Detention Facility (and San
Pedro) accounted for the largest number of detainees among all counties in the United States.
It was followed by Stewart County, Georgia which has the Stewart Detention Center.”); PENN
STATE LAW CENTER FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS CLINIC & PROJECT SOUTH, IMPRISONED
JUSTICE: INSIDE TWO GEORGIA IMMIGRANT DETENTION CENTERS 26 (2017),
http://projectsouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Imprisoned_Justice_Report-1.pdf
[hereinafter IMPRISONED JUSTICE]
7 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 1, at 5.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 6.
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officer.10 Rather than returning Lima-Diaz to Stewart Detention
Center where he was previously detained, ICE agents moved him to
the Irwin County Detention Center in Ocilla, Georgia. 11 There, ICE
incarcerated him for over two months without a bond hearing until
he appeared before a new IJ on July 11, 2017.12 This time, the IJ set
a $25,000 bond, even though Lima-Diaz had neither been arrested
for another crime nor had he violated the terms of his previous
bond.13 When Lima-Diaz’s counsel protested the high amount, the
IJ crossed out the $25,000 amount by hand and denied bond
entirely.14 Lima-Diaz’s habeas petition was dismissed on January
18, 2018, and, as of the time of writing, he remains in detention at
Irwin Detention Center.15
Lima-Diaz’s story is common. Like the 34,376 aliens who remain
in ICE custody on an average day, he was subject to immigration
detention in an isolated, rural area of the United States, awaiting
potential deportation.16 He was also one of the 374,059 ICE
detainees who are transferred to different detention facilities each
year.17 He may yet become one of the 240,255 aliens removed from
the interior United States by ICE each year.18
Each of these common components of immigration detention—
transfers of detainees,19 denials of bond,20 and prolonged detention

Id. at 7.
Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 9–10.
15 Order at 1, Lima-Diaz v. Gallagher, No. 7:17-cv-131 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 10, 2018).
16 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2018 33 (2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20FY18%20BIB%20Final.pdf
(noting that in FY 2016, “[ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations] housed a daily average
of 34,376 aliens”).
17 New Data on 637 Detention Facilities Used by ICE in FY 2015, TRAC IMMIGRATION
(Apr. 12, 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/422 (last visited Aug. 15, 2018) (“All
totaled, there were 374,059 recorded transfers among ICE facilities during FY 2015.”).
18 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 166, at 33.
19 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Due Process Rights and Detainee Prison
Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L.J. 17, 19–23 (2011) (arguing that transferring detainees to isolated prisons effectively
prevented them from obtaining counsel).
20 See Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial
Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 159–61 (2016) (explaining that failures in the bond
determination process force immigration detainees to remain incarcerated for unnecessarily
long periods of time).
10
11
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periods21—raises serious concerns about the fundamental justice of
the immigration detention system. Simultaneously occurring, these
concerns amount to a crisis of justice. This Note explains how the
tremendous discretion afforded to IJs to make decisions in
immigration cases interacts with the ample discretion that
immigration enforcers possess to transfer detainees. IJs are
afforded broad discretion in deciding the availability of pretrial
release and the final outcome of detainees’ cases.22 Meanwhile, ICE
has the authority to transfer detainees to any detention facility in
the country, where local IJs are appointed to preside over bond and
merits hearings.23 Thus, ICE can effectively choose which IJ will
make a critical case determination. Because IJ decision making is
inconsistent, this choice of IJ is almost outcome-determinative,
allowing ICE to forum shop to secure favorable rulings.
This Note argues that ICE’s unconstrained ability to transfer
immigration detainees to any detention center allows the agency to
engage in judge shopping to secure favorable rulings. Part II
outlines the statutes presently governing immigration detention,
explains how ICE transfers detainees, and discusses the
problematic and outcome-influencing conditions of detention. Part
III explains the statutory authority of IJs, the factors that influence
their decisions, and the tendencies in the outcomes of their
decisions. Part IV explains how ICE can judge-shop by transferring
detainees, provides possible examples of such judge-shopping, and
explains why judge shopping offends critical notions of fairness that
are central to both immigration policy and general adjudicatory
fairness. Part V concludes that there are few options to foreclose
this possibility without an overhaul of the immigration detention
framework.
II. THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION FRAMEWORK
Immigration detention is governed by a complex statutory
scheme and implemented by multiple federal agencies. This section
21 See Michelle Firmacion, Protecting Immigrants from Prolonged Preremoval Detention:
When “It Depends” is No Longer Reasonable, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 601, 603–04 (2017)
(analyzing prolonged periods of immigration detention and the proposed solutions to the
issue).
22 See infra Part III.A (describing the scant authorities governing IJs’ decisions).
23 See infra Part II.B (analyzing ICE’s broad authority to transfer detainees and the
increasing rate of transfers).
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first outlines the relevant laws and policies regarding detention and
detainee transfers. It then turns to the problematic and potentially
outcome-influencing conditions that prevail in immigration
detention facilities.
A. STATUTORY AUTHORITIES FOR DETENTION

Three classes of aliens are subject to immigration detention: (1)
arriving aliens, (2) noncitizens subject to possible removal, and (3)
noncitizens ordered removed but awaiting deportation.24 The
detention of each class is governed by separate statutory provisions
interpreted by the agency and courts.251. Arriving Aliens 8 U.S.C. §
1225 provides inspection and detention standards for all aliens
“present in the United States who [have] not been admitted or who
arrive[] in the United States.”26 The term “arriving aliens” is a
misnomer, because this class includes not only aliens who present
themselves for admission “at a designated port of arrival,” but also
aliens who are already present in the country, provided that they
meet the other requirements of the statute.27 All arriving aliens are
subject to inspection to determine whether they are admissible to
the United States.28
1. Arriving Aliens.
Asylum seekers constitute a substantial portion of the arriving
aliens subject to §1225’s provisions.29 If an arriving alien applies for
asylum or claims a fear of persecution if not admitted, then an
asylum officer must assess the alien’s application and determine
whether the alien’s fear of persecution is credible.30 These aliens are
24 See id. at 606–07 (outlining these three categories of immigration detainees) (citing
Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventative Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85, 141–44 (2011)).
25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012) (governing arriving aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012) (governing
noncitizens subject to removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (governing noncitizens ordered removed).
26 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (2012).
27 Id.
28 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (2012).
29 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, LIFELINE ON LOCKDOWN: INCREASED U.S. DETENTION OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS 11–12 (2016) (“In fiscal year 2014, ICE held 44,270 asylum seekers in
immigration detention facilities, nearly a three-fold increase from 2010 . . . .”); see also NADWA
MOSSAAD, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL FLOW
REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2015 7 (2016) (“Overall, grants of asylum increased by
[12%] from 23,374 in 2014 to 26,124 in 2015 . . . .”).
30 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
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subject to mandatory detention pending such a determination.31 If
the asylum officer denies the application or finds the fear of
persecution not credible, then the alien is subject to further
detention pending removal.32
2. Noncitizens Subject to Removal.
Noncitizens are subject to removal based on one of two
provisions. First, under §1226(a), the United States Attorney
General may generally issue warrants for any noncitizen to
determine whether that noncitizen is subject to removal.33 While
noncitizens may be detained until an immigration court determines
that they should be removed, their detention is discretionary
because an IJ may release them on bond or conditional parole.34
However, the Attorney General may revoke any bond or other form
of release at any time.35
Second, certain criminal noncitizen aliens are subject to removal
under §1226(c).36 Unlike detainees under §1226(a), aliens arrested
under §1226(c) are subject to mandatory detention pending
determination of their removal.37 Only certain crimes warrant
detention, and §1226(c) incorporates these crimes by reference to
other statutes.38 Those crimes include various controlled substance

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012).
Id.
33 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien
may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States.”).
34 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1) (2012) (“[The Attorney General] may continue to detain the
arrested alien.” (emphasis added)); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012) (permitting the release
of an arrested alien on a “bond of at least $1,500” or conditional parole); see also Firmacion,
supra note 21, at 606 (“Detention under [1226(a)] is discretionary and aliens are entitled to
bond hearings.”).
35 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (2012) (“The Attorney General at any time may revoke a bond or
parole authorized under subsection (a) of this section, rearrest the alien under the original
warrant, and detain the alien.”).
36 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
37 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012) (“The Attorney General shall take [the alien] into
custody . . . .” (emphasis added)).
38 See id. (listing the relevant statutes for crimes sufficient to warrant arrest).
31
32
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crimes,39 possession or sale of a firearm,40 terrorist activities,41
multiple crimes with an aggregate sentence of more than five
years,42 aggravated felonies,43 and “crimes of moral turpitude” with
a sentence of one year or longer.44 Once a noncitizen is released from
criminal incarceration based on a conviction for one of these crimes,
ICE may subject the noncitizen to civil detention pursuant to
§1226(c) at any time.45 Once noncitizens are placed in immigration
detention under §1226(c), there is no statutory provision
authorizing their release on bond.
3. Noncitizens Ordered Removed.
Once an immigration court has ordered a noncitizen’s removal,
the Attorney General has ninety days to deport the noncitizen.46
Noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention during this removal
period.47 If a noncitizen is not deported during the ninety-day
removal period, the Attorney General must release the noncitizen

39 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (“[V]iolation of (or conspiracy or attempt to violate)
any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled
substance . . .”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (“Any alien who is, or at any time after
admission has been, a drug abuser or addict is deportable.”).
40 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2012).
41 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012) (listing as “terrorist activities,” among others,
membership in a terrorist organization, engagement in terrorist activity, and likelihood to
engage in terrorist activity).
42 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(B) (2012).
43 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
44 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
45 See Jenna Neumann, Proposing a One-Year Time Bar for 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), 115 MICH.
L. REV. 707, 712–13 (2017) (alteration in original) (stating that the Board of Immigration
Appeals has held that §1226(c) “allow[s] for mandatory detention any time after the alien's
release”) (citing In re Rojas, 13 I. & N. Dec. 117, 127 (2001) (interpreting §1226(c) to permit
arrest of a criminal noncitizen at any time after release from state criminal custody)). But see
Castañeda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15, 42 (1st Cir. 2015) (disagreeing with the BIA’s interpretation
and holding that §1226(c) did not authorize ICE to detain a criminal noncitizen after the
“alien’s years of living freely”).
46 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“[W]hen an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney
General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days. . . .”).
47 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2012) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall
detain the alien . . . .” (emphasis added)); Firmacion, supra note 21, at 606–07 (“Section
1231(a)(1) authorizes mandatory detention during a ninety-day removal period.”) (citing
Klein & Wittes, supra note 24, at 144).
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from detention.48 However, §1231(a) also allows for discretionary
detention of criminal noncitizens49 beyond the removal period.50
4. Statutory Overview.
To illustrate the operation of §§1225, 1226, and 1231, assume
that X is an alien who arrives at the United States border and
claims a fear of persecution if denied entry into the country.
Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) of the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) subjects X to mandatory detention until an
immigration court decides whether X’s claimed fear is credible. CBP
and ICE detain X for one month before an immigration court grants
X asylum.51 X is released and decides to settle in Georgia.
Later, X is arrested and convicted in a Georgia state court for
possession of one gram of cocaine and is sentenced to the statutory
minimum one-year incarceration.52 Upon X’s release from a Georgia
prison, the Attorney General issues a warrant for X’s arrest, as a
criminal noncitizen who is subject to removal pursuant to §1226(c).
After X’s arrest, ICE may detain X under §1226(c) until an
immigration court determines whether to remove X. ICE detains X
for six months under §1226(c) before X appears in an immigration
court for removal proceedings.53 Totaling X’s detention times under
§§1225 and 1226(c), X has been detained by ICE for seven months.
The immigration court decides that X will, in fact, be removed.
ICE then continues to detain X for the ninety-day removal period
under §1231. The ninety-day removal period expires, and X has not
been deported. Nevertheless, because X committed a requisite crime
48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (2012) (mandating the release of the alien after the removal
period, but imposing supervision requirements on the alien, including periodic appearances
before an immigration officer, medical and psychiatric exams, and reports of activities).
49 See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the status of criminal noncitizens).
50 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2012) (“An alien ordered removed [who has committed a
requisite crime under 1226(c)] . . . may be detained beyond the removal period . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
51 See García Hernández, supra note 19, at 33 (noting that the average detention period
among all classes of ICE detainees is 37 days) (citing DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOM ENFORCEMENT'S TRACKING AND TRANSFERS OF
DETAINEES 2 (2009)).
52 See O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(c)(2) (2017) (imposing a minimum one-year prison sentence for
the possession of at least one gram of a controlled substance).
53 See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2015) (imposing a six-month
time limit for pre-removal detention under §1226(c) before a detainee is entitled to a bond
hearing), rev’d by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). As the six-month limit is no
longer valid in light of Jennings, detention times may now greatly exceed six months.
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under §1226(c)—possession of a controlled substance—ICE
continues to detain X. ICE finally deports X six months after the
immigration court ordered X’s removal.54 X’s total civil detention
time since arriving in the United States was 13 months—exceeding
X’s one-year criminal prison sentence by one month.55
B. PREVALENCE OF DETAINEE TRANSFERS

ICE uses three types of facilities to house immigrant detainees.
First, Service Processing Centers (SPCs) are owned by ICE but
operated by private contractors.56 Second, Contract Detention
Facilities (CDFs) are both owned and operated by private
contractors.57 Third, ICE has Intergovernmental Agency Service
Agreements (IGSAs) with certain local jails to house detainees.58 All
in all, ICE maintains over 300 detention facilities to house over
30,000 detainees per day.59 50% of detainees are housed in 240
IGSAs with county prisoners and other non-immigration inmates.60
In 2016, ICE spent $6.1 billion on immigration detention.61
Under §1231(g)(1), the Attorney General and ICE determine
where to house each detainee in their custody.62 Courts have held
that this statutory power further authorizes ICE (through the

54 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700–01 (2001) (establishing a presumptive sixmonth maximum term for post-removal detention under §1231).
55 This assumes that X was not paroled during his state prison sentence.
56 DORA SCHRIRO, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T,
IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2009)
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See id. (“ICE assigns aliens to over 300 detention facilities.”); BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL
YEAR 2018, supra note 16, at 33 (“[ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations] housed a daily
average of 34,376 aliens.”).
60 IMPRISONED JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 19 (“Overall, in 2015, 72% of immigration
detention beds were located in facilities run by for-profit prison corporations under ICE
contracts. This is in stark contrast to the 7% of federal and state non-immigration related
incarcerated individuals who were held in for-profit detention in 2014.” (footnotes omitted));
SCHRIRO, supra note 56, at 10 (“50 percent of the population is detained primarily in nondedicated or shared-use county jails through IGSA. These facilities, approximately 240 in
number, also house county prisoners and sometimes, other inmates.”).
61 IMPRISONED JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 18.
62 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1) (2012) (“The Attorney General shall arrange for appropriate places
of detention for aliens detained pending removal or a decision on removal.”); see also García
Hernández, supra note 19, at 22 (“[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security now carries
discretionary authority [to arrange for immigration detention].”).
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Attorney General) to transfer detainees as the agency sees fit.63 ICE
has regularly utilized this authority to move detainees from one
detention facility to another; the number of annual detainee
transfers doubled from 122,783 in 2003 to 261,941 in 2007.64 For
instance, in 2007, it is estimated that ICE transferred eighty-four
percent of all immigration detainees to different facilities.65
In response to highly publicized studies criticizing this
increasing rate of detainee transfers,66 ICE altered its policy in 2012
by limiting the transfer of detainees who had family or retained
counsel near their location of detention or who had open proceedings
in immigration court at their current detention center.67 But so long
as one of these factors is not present, ICE may transfer a detainee
for any number of reasons, including preventing the overcrowding
of a facility, ensuring the safety of a detainee and ICE personnel, or
removing detainees from a substandard facility.68 While the reform
was initially praised by critics,69 the number of transfers has not
declined as expected, suggesting that ICE has derogated from its
own standards. In 2015, for instance, ICE recorded 374,059
detainee transfers70—nearly a 50% increase from the 2008 total that
motivated criticism and ICE’s resulting policy shift.71 Transfer of
detainees thus remains a markedly widespread procedure, as, on

63 See, e.g., Van Dinh v. Reno, 197 F.3d 427, 433 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Attorney General's
discretionary power to transfer aliens from one locale to another, as she deems appropriate,
arises from [§1231’s] language.”); see also García Hernández, supra note 19, at 22 (“Federal
courts have consistently held that [§1231] grants the executive branch almost limitless
authority to house detainees wherever the government sees fit.”).
64 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO
REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2009).
65 García Hernández, supra note 19, at 20.
66 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 3–4 (arguing that ICE’s detainee
transfer policy hinders detainees’ access to counsel, prevents full adjudication of claims on
the merits, and unnecessarily alienates detainees from their families).
67 U.S. IMMIGRATION CUSTOMS AND ENF’T, POLICY 11022.1: DETAINEE TRANSFERS 2–3
(2012), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/hd-detainee-transfers.pdf.
68 Id. at 3.
69 See Update: ICE Limits Immigrant Detainee Transfers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May
22, 2012, 2:32 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/22/update-ice-limits-immigrantdetainee-transfers (last visited Aug. 15, 2018) (“Human Rights Watch considers ICE’s new
policy directive a positive step toward protecting the basic rights of immigrants and urges the
agency to implement it efficiently and rigorously.”).
70 New Data on 637 Detention Facilities Used by ICE in FY 2015, supra note 17,(“All
totaled, there were 374,059 recorded transfers among ICE facilities during FY 2015.”).
71 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 2.
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average, every ICE detainee is transferred at some point during the
year.72
C. OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION

While the bases for ICE detention and transfers present
important problems, the actual conditions of immigration detention
are the most unsettling aspects of the detention system. These
conditions not only offend notions of fairness, but also often affect
the outcome of immigration court decisions on the merits.
ICE detainees may be housed in detention centers in remote,
rural areas.73 For example, Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin,
Georgia is the second largest immigration detention facility in the
country, maintaining 1,752 beds.74 Meanwhile, Lumpkin, Georgia
has an estimated total population of only 2,741 according to the
2010 U.S. Census.75 This tendency to house detainees in rural areas
has several deleterious effects on detainees.
First, the remoteness of the detention locations severely hinders
detainees’ access to counsel. Fewer attorneys are present in these
isolated regions, and thus detainees are far less likely to retain a
lawyer to represent them in immigration proceedings.76 Inability to
secure counsel also seems to have a significant effect on the outcome
of immigration cases themselves. For example, of the deportation
proceedings that began in fiscal year (FY) 2016 and have now
concluded, 41% of immigrants who were represented by counsel
were ordered removed,77 while by contrast, 89% of pro se

See id.
See García Hernández, supra note 19, at 35 (comparing detention center populations to
U.S. Census data to show that, at times, detainees actually account for a significant portion
of a town’s total population).
74 See IMPRISONED JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 26.
75 Community
Facts:
Lumpkin
city,
Georgia,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml?src=bkmk
(last
visited Aug. 15, 2018).
76 See Ingrid Eagly and Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2015) (“[I]mmigrants with court hearings in
large cities had a representation rate of 47%, more than four times greater than the 11%
representation rate of those with hearings in small cities or rural locations.”).
77 See Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta (last visited Aug. 15, 2018). This percentage was
calculated by comparing the fiscal year the case began, the immigrant’s representation
status, and the outcome of the case. Immigrants were represented in 45,248 of the cases
decided, and 18,359 were ordered removed. Id.
72
73
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immigrants were ordered removed.78 Immigrants who are
represented by lawyers who specialize in immigration proceedings
are even more likely to secure relief.79
Second, isolated detention locations separate detainees from
their families and support networks. As noted above, on average,
every detainee is transferred at some point in a given year.80
Additionally, when detainees are transferred, they are more likely
to be moved from states with high-density immigrant populations
to more sparsely populated states.81 Thus, more likely than not,
detainees will be housed in locations far from their homes, which
makes it difficult for family members to visit.82 This toxic
combination of being placed in legal limbo and being isolated from
supportive personal relationships is psychologically detrimental for
many detainees.83 These emotional factors can directly influence the
outcome of legal proceedings, as feelings of desperation motivate

78 Id. (showing that immigrants were unrepresented in 61,662 of the cases decided, and
55,089 were ordered removed).
79 See JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, REFUGEE
ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 44–46 (2009)
(analyzing the results of asylum cases from 2000 to 2004 and finding that asylum grant rates
varied significantly based on representation—16% of unrepresented asylum seekers, 45% of
represented asylum seekers, and 89% of asylum seekers represented by the Georgetown
Clinic, and 96% of asylum seekers represented by pro bono lawyers from Human Rights First
were granted asylum). By contrast, Lumpkin, Georgia, “which completed 42,006 removal
cases during the study period, did not have a single practicing immigration attorney in the
city.” Eagly and Shafer, supra note 76, at 42.
80 See supra notes 72–72 and accompanying text.
81 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 32 (“[T]here is a great deal of transfer
traffic originating in and going to Arizona, California, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
However, Louisiana is far more likely to receive transferred detainees than it is to originate
transfers, and California, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon are more likely to originate
transfers than they are to receive transferred detainees.”); García Hernández, supra note 19,
at 37–38 (“The prevalence of immigrant communities in large urban areas suggests that
[lawful permanent residents] . . . are likely to have been initially apprehended at great
distance from the rural immigration prisons where they are forced to wage their last battle
to stay in this country.”).
82 See IMPRISONED JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 28 (“[N]on-legal visits [at Stewart Detention
Center] are permitted once a week for an hour, though the remote location limits the ability
of many family members to visit.”). Furthermore, detainees’ family members may also face
possible detention due to their legal status, compelling them to avoid visitations entirely. Id.
83 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 79 (reporting that detainees who
underwent psychological analysis were “already in a desperate place, and they are being
separated from anyone who can be any kind of support to them”).
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some detainees to abandon legitimate claims in order to secure a
more expedient release.84
Third, the location of detention can affect the substantive law
applied during immigration proceedings. This is especially true for
criminal aliens because the U.S. Courts of Appeals interpret the
severity of certain felonies differently, affecting whether an alien’s
crimes are sufficient to warrant §1226(c) detention.85 Thus, a
detainee could face an increased likelihood of deportation based
solely upon a transfer to a different jurisdiction that more harshly
interprets the detainee’s criminal history.86
In response to these problems, ICE asserts that its tendency to
locate immigration detention facilities in sparsely populated areas
serves important policy interests. Specifically, ICE has cited
detention costs, proximity to airports, and the availability of
employees as rationales that influence these choices.87 While ICE
may offer facially legitimate reasons for its detention centers’
locations, the detrimental effects on detainees nonetheless continue.
III. IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND ADJUDICATORY INCONSISTENCY
Immigration Judges (IJs) are the principal administrative
adjudicators for both bond and merit decisions in the immigration
courts. Like all judges, the IJ has a substantial effect on the outcome
of legal proceedings. The standards governing IJ decisions,
however, are unique and distinguishable from those of other federal
judges. This section examines (1) the statutory authorities
governing IJs, (2) the resulting variations that prevail in IJ
decisions, and (3) the factors that predominantly influence IJs in
reaching their decisions.

84 See id. at 81 (“[T]he transfers of detainees away from family members wore down the
detainees’ willingness to spend the time in detention necessary to pursue appeals of their
cases. Eventually, many signed voluntary departure agreements.”) (footnote omitted).
85 See id. at 73 (“Since the federal circuit courts of appeals vary in their interpretations of
criminal offenses, the transfer of a detainee can affect the way the court will interpret
whether the criminal offense he is being deported for is an ‘aggravated felony.’”).
86 See id. at 73–74 (demonstrating the difference between Michigan’s and Louisiana’s
interpretations of two misdemeanor controlled substance charges as an example of this
phenomenon).
87 See García Hernández, supra note 19, at 36 (reporting the factors included by ICE in its
meetings on detention maintenance).
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A. THE SCANT AUTHORITIES GOVERNING IMMIGRATION JUDGES

Few authorities provide direct guidance regarding IJs. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(4) defines an “immigration judge” as “an attorney whom
the Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within
the Executive Office for Immigration Review, qualified to conduct
specified classes of proceedings, including a hearing under §1229a
of this title.”88 It is important to note several details in this initial
definition. First, IJs serve at the pleasure of the Attorney General
and do not receive lifetime appointments.89 As a result, “IJs
arguably have less structural independence than federal judges and
potentially less independence than administrative law judges.”90
Second, the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”)
directly oversees IJs for the Attorney General.91 Although the
statute itself does not outline specific hiring criteria for IJs, the
EOIR currently requires only that IJs have seven years of prior
legal experience.92
Among their duties, IJs must “administer oaths, receive
evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine aliens and
any witnesses” at the court to which they are assigned.93 IJs are
provided little guidance as to how they should “exercise their
independent judgment and discretion”94 in carrying out these
duties, but agency policy documents give some structure. For
example, the Immigration Judge Benchbook lists several factors
that IJs may consider in deciding whether to grant bond and the

8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012).
See Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV.
117, 123 (2016) (“[I]mmigration judges do not enjoy life tenure and can be removed from the
bench for misconduct or reassigned to another position at the discretion of the Attorney
General.”).
90 BANKS MILLER, LINDA CAMP KEITH & JENNIFER S. HOLMES, IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND
U.S. ASYLUM POLICY 9 (2015).
91 See id. (“The EOIR is charged with administering immigration courts nationwide. . . .
Within the EOIR, the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge . . . has administrative
supervision for approximately 260 IJs.”).
92 Id.
93 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b).
94 Id. See also In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (2006) (“An Immigration Judge has broad
discretion in deciding the factors that he or she may consider in custody redeterminations.
The Immigration Judge may choose to give greater weight to one factor over others, as long
as the decision is reasonable.”), abrogated by Pensamito v. McDonald, No. 18-0475-PBS, 2018
WL 2305667 (D. Mass. May 21, 2018).
88
89
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amount of bond to set.95 These factors include the immigrant’s
length of residence, family ties to the United States, employment
history, prior evasions of ICE custody, and criminal record.96 IJ
decisions are also reviewable by the Board of Immigration
Appeals.97
B. THE WIDE VARIATION IN IMMIGRATION CASE OUTCOMES

IJ decisions have recently faced heavy criticism for their
inconsistency across and within jurisdictions.98 While much of the
recent research focuses on the wide variation of results in asylum
cases,99 some research now implicates other types of IJ decisions as
well.100 The results of these studies demonstrate that there is an
increasingly wide variation in the outcome of immigration court
decisions.101 Such inconsistency in adjudication raises important
questions about the fairness of the process afforded immigrants in
immigration courts.
Asylum cases are classic examples of such inconsistency because
the prevalence of variability can be demonstrated at multiple levels
of abstraction. For example, the rate of granting asylum to
immigrants from countries that produce large numbers of asylum
seekers ranges from 52% in New York immigration courts to only
12% in Atlanta immigration courts.102 When analysis is restricted

95 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK: BOND WORKSHEET,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/987996/download.
96 Id. See also Ryo, supra note 89, at 131 (listing these factors among others).
97 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(c).
98 See, e.g., MILLER, KEITH & HOLMES, supra note 90, at 16 (“[D]isparities across courts
and across judges have raised significant questions about the quality and consistency of
justice in immigration courts . . . .”); RAMJI-NOGALES, SCHOENHOLTZ & SCHRAG, supra note
79, at 3 (“[T]he result may be determined as much or more by who [the adjudicator] is, or
where the court is located, as by the facts and the law of the case.”); Ryo, supra note 89, at
119 (analyzing immigration bond hearings and finding only one significant variable
influencing bond decisions).
99 See generally MILLER, KEITH & HOLMES, supra note 90 (analyzing the factors that
contribute to IJ decisions in asylum cases); RAMJI-NOGALES, SCHOENHOLTZ & SCHRAG, supra
note 79 (focusing upon the variation in asylum grant rates for different nationalities).
100 See Ryo, supra note 89, at 119 (“I examine for the first time judicial decision making in
immigration bond hearings.”).
101 See infra notes 99–108 and accompanying text (illustrating the variations in different
types of IJ decisions).
102 RAMJI-NOGALES, SCHOENHOLTZ & SCHRAG, supra note 79, at 36–37.
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to a single nationality, the results are even more pronounced.103 For
example, “a Chinese asylum seeker unlucky enough to have her case
heard before the Atlanta Immigration Court had a 7% chance of
success on her asylum claim, as compared to 47% nationwide.”104
However, inconsistency is prevalent within immigration courts as
well, as a survey of seventy-four IJs from the five immigration
courts that heard the most asylum cases revealed that “32% [of
those IJs] decided asylum cases . . . at rates significantly discrepant
from their court’s average grant rate.”105
These wide variations are not limited to asylum decisions. Emily
Ryo analyzed bond decisions for detainees held for longer than six
months in immigration courts in the Central District of California
and found that some judges granted bond in 75% percent of cases,
while others granted bond in only 22% of cases.106 Additionally,
when IJs granted bond, the amounts varied significantly—$10,667
to $80,500—and were well above the statutory minimum bond
amount of $1,500.107
IJ decisions also vary widely concerning the outcomes of removal
proceedings. For example, of removal cases that began in FY 2016
and have reached an outcome, the San Francisco Immigration Court
ordered removal for 47% of immigrants.108 By contrast, the Atlanta
Immigration Court, which decided a similar number of cases,

103 Id. at 34 (“[E]ven for asylum seekers from countries that produce a relatively high
percentage of asylees, there are serious disparities among immigration courts in the rates at
which they grant asylum . . . .”).
104 Id. at 35.
105 Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
106 Ryo, supra note 89, at 118–19. Notably, the class of detainees at the basis of Ryo’s
analysis is the same class at issue in Rodriguez v. Robbins, in which the Ninth Circuit held
that detainees who are detained by ICE for longer than six months were entitled to a bond
hearing. 804 F.3d 1060, 1082 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he mandatory provisions of § 1225(b) simply
expire at six months, at which point the government's authority to detain the alien shifts to
§ 1226(a), which is discretionary and which we have already held requires a bond hearing.”
(citation omitted)). The United States appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
107 Ryo, supra note 89, at 119.
108 See Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, supra note 77. This
percentage was calculated by comparing the fiscal year the case began, the immigration court
that decided the case, and the outcome of the case. Of the 4,874 cases that reached an
outcome—calculated by subtracting the number of pending cases from the total number of
cases heard—2,296 immigrants were ordered removed. Id.
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ordered removal for 87% of immigrants.109 Of all removal cases in
the United States during the same period, immigration courts
ordered removal for 69% of immigrants.110 There are thus wide
variations in IJs’ decisions regarding asylum, and bonds, and
removal.111 Such statistics indicate a startling conclusion: the
location of detention and the individual IJ who decides an
immigrant’s case may substantially influence the outcome of the
detainee’s case.
C. NON-MERITORIOUS FACTORS INFLUENCING IJ DECISIONS

While it is relatively easy to demonstrate that IJ decisions vary
widely, it is much more difficult to adequately explain why the
variation occurs. Shedding some light on this more difficult inquiry
are multiple studies which show that IJs’ personal tendencies and
predispositions on certain social and legal issues strongly influence
the decisions they reach in immigration cases.112
ICE provides IJs with very little guidance regarding the
appropriate factors to consider in reaching decisions, so IJs enjoy
broad discretion in their judgments113 and often disproportionately
consider a small number of issues in ruling on cases. For example,
in deciding bond requests, the IJ Benchbook instructs IJs to
consider a number of factors, including criminal history, family ties
to the United States, and employment history.114 Nevertheless,
bivariate analysis of the relation of these factors to the outcome of
bond hearings shows that “[t]he only legally relevant factors
significantly related to bond grant/deny decisions are those

109 See id. (showing that of the 4,656 cases that reached an outcome—calculated by
subtracting the number of pending cases from the total number of cases heard—4,052
immigrants were ordered removed).
110 See id. (showing that of the 106,910 cases that reached an outcome—calculated by
subtracting the number of pending cases from the total number of cases heard—73,448
immigrants were ordered removed).
111 See supra notes 97–102.
112 These studies have predominantly analyzed asylum grant rates, rather than IJ
decisions more generally. However, it is likely that the factors that prevailed in granting
asylum similarly influence decisions in other types of proceedings, since the same IJs handle
all types of immigration cases.
113 See Ryo, supra note 89, at 131 (providing the eight factors included in the IJ Benchbook
for bond hearings, yet acknowledging that IJs are under no obligation to abide by these factors
so long as the decision is “reasonable”).
114 See supra notes 96–96 and accompanying text.
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pertaining to the detainees’ criminal history.”115 Thus, it is unclear
whether and to what extent ICE’s promulgated standards for
deciding cases influence IJ decisions.
Statistical analysis of IJs’ asylum decisions indicate that many
personal characteristics of IJs might directly influence their
decisions. For example, an IJ’s prior work experience has a
significant effect on asylum grant rates.116 Specifically, an IJ’s prior
positions in the government, positions with the Department of
Homeland Security, and military experience all decrease an IJ’s
likelihood of granting asylum by at least seven percentage points.117
On the other hand, IJs who have had previous careers with NGOs,
academia, or private practice are at least 6% more likely to grant
asylum.118 An IJ’s sex also exerts a substantial influence on asylum
grant rates, as women grant asylum in 53.8% of cases, while men
only grant asylum in 37.3%of cases.119
More nuanced factors can also influence an individual IJ’s
decision-making. For example, immigrants who are detained during
asylum proceedings “are [twelve] to [fifteen] percentage points less
likely to receive relief than are those who have never been
detained.”120 Even economic trends play a role in decisions, as
increases in the national unemployment rate correspond to
decreases in asylum grant rates by as much as eight percentage
points.121
Finally, systemic issues in immigration courts play a role in the
variation of decision rates. IJs face a severe backlog of cases, as “IJs
typically handle sixty-nine cases a week and must dispose of
twenty-seven cases per week.”122 Currently, there are 733,365
pending immigration cases nationwide that must be adjudicated by
fewer than 300 IJs.123 This number is up from 516,031 cases in 2016
and 174,935 in 2007.124 In handling this massive case backlog, IJs
lack the staff support that is typical of other federal judges, as most
Ryo, supra note 89, at 135.
RAMJI-NOGALES, SCHOENHOLTZ & SCHRAG, supra note 79, at 49–50.
117 Id. at 50.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 47.
120 MILLER, KEITH & HOLMES, supra note 90, at 71.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 16 (citing TRAC statistics).
123 See
Immigration
Court
Backlog
Tool,
TRAC
IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog (last accessed Aug. 15, 2018).
124 Id.
115
116
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immigration courts go without bailiffs, clerks, and assistants.125
Thus, the individualized factors listed above may play an even
greater influence in cases, as IJs must look to dispose of matters
quickly in order to stay up to date with their incessant workload.
Also, because IJs are not appointed for life and are removable by the
Attorney General, they may be less likely to grant release for certain
detainees at the risk of the detainee’s recidivism or commission of
other harm.126
The critical takeaway from these tendencies is that IJ decisions
may be influenced by a plethora of factors, many of which are
entirely unrelated to the merits of the immigrants’ cases. A
normative stance on these issues is outside the scope of this Note.
Rather, this Note observes that an immigration detainee’s case may
be more likely to be determined by external factors rather than the
actual merits of the claim.
IV. ICE JUDGE-SHOPPING TACTICS
Immigration detainee transfers, detention conditions, and
variability in IJ decision-making all raise independent causes for
concern about the current immigration court system. Taken
together, however, these factors may combine to present a true
crisis of justice. In particular, current legal standards make it
possible for ICE to use detainee transfers in the service of
intentional judge-shopping in order to secure favorable bond or case
outcomes. In this Part, I explain this potential for abuse,
demonstrate possible evidence of its occurrence, and argue that it
offends notions of fundamental justice and legal ethics.

125 See MILLER, KEITH & HOLMES, supra note 90, at 16 (“IJs typically have little staff
assistance; most courts are not assisted by a clerk or bailiff, and the judges often have to
operate their own tape machines.”).
126 See Ryo, supra note 89, at 147 (“Given that immigration judges may be removed from
the bench, the desire to not ‘rock the boat’ may be common. In this context, immigration
judges may be especially motivated to avoid erroneous bond decisions involving detainees
with certain types of convictions.”) (citation omitted).
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A. POTENTIAL FOR ICE TO ABUSE THE DETENTION FRAMEWORK

As outlined above, ICE has nearly unlimited authority to
transfer detainees to different facilities in the United States.127 The
frequency of transfers has recently reached an all-time high,128 and,
on average, every detainee is transferred at least once in a given
year.129 Additionally, because IJs only hear cases in the immigration
courts to which they are assigned, ICE effectively determines which
IJ will preside over a detainee’s case by transferring the detainee to
a location within the IJ’s jurisdiction.
Normally, this arrangement would not be problematic, as a case’s
outcome would ideally remain relatively consistent since all IJs
apply the same body of law. As indicated by the wide variation in IJ
decisions explained above, however, the individual characteristics
and background of the IJ deciding a detainee’s case can be outcomedeterminative.130 This presents the potential for ICE to abuse such
variation, as moving a detainee to a certain facility not only
determines who will hear the case, but also how the case will likely
be decided.
As others have already argued, the transfer of detainees to
detention facilities in rural areas effectively prevents them from
accessing counsel and subjects them to prolonged isolation from
their families and networks of support.131 Together, these
phenomena greatly reduce the likelihood that a detainee can obtain
127 See Van Dinh v. Reno, 197 F.3d 427, 433 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Attorney General's
discretionary power to transfer aliens from one locale to another, as she deems appropriate,
arises from [§1231’s] language.”).
128 See supra note 62–63, 68–70 and accompanying text (indicating that ICE has derogated
its own internally-imposed standards by continuing to increase the rate of detainee
transfers).
129 See Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, supra note 77(“[E]ach
detainee experienced, on average, at least one transfer to another facility.”). Because this is
an average for all detainees, however, many detainees may have simply been transferred
more than once.
130 See, e.g., MILLER, KEITH & HOLMES, supra note 90, at 16 (“[O]utcomes of individual
asylum claims have come to depend largely on chance; namely, the IJ who happens to be
assigned to hear the case.”) (internal quotations omitted).
131 See Eagly and Shafer, supra note 76, at 40–42 (“[I]mmigrants with court hearings in
large cities had a representation rate of 47%, more than four times greater than the 11%
representation rate of those with hearings in small cities or rural locations.”); García
Hernández, supra note 19, at 37–38 (“The prevalence of immigrant communities in large
urban areas suggests that [lawful permanent residents] . . . are likely to have been initially
apprehended at great distance from the rural immigration prisons where they are forced to
wage their last battle to stay in this country.” (footnote omitted)).
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relief from an immigration court.132 Therefore, ICE may use the
transfer of detainees to particular locations to reduce a detainee’s
ability to secure a favorable outcome. When considered in
conjunction with well-documented IJ tendencies, as well as the
varying interpretations of the immigration consequences of criminal
statutes among the Courts of Appeals,133 a detainee’s prospects of
success may be entirely changed solely by moving that detainee to
a different facility.
B. POSSIBLE EVIDENCE OF ICE FORUM-SHOPPING TACTICS

While this interrelatedness shows how ICE agents could take
advantage of the system, proving actual malicious intent is quite
difficult. ICE has provided facially neutral policy justifications for
its decisions to transfer detainees and maintain detention facilities
in remote areas.134 Nonetheless, recent cases shed some light on
ICE’s other possible motivations.
By transferring detainees, ICE can avoid unfavorable IJ
determinations made at the detention center of departure. For
example, in Lima-Diaz, described above, 135 an IJ at Stewart
Detention Center granted bond, and the detainee was released upon
payment.136 However, ICE simply re-apprehended the detainee a
few months later without appealing the bond to the Board of
Immigration Appeals.137 ICE then detained the immigrant at a
different facility, where the IJ denied bond.138 Thus, even after an
IJ grants relief to a detainee, ICE can circumvent the result by
transferring the detainee to a different facility where another IJ
may reach a different judgment.139 ICE can even foreclose the
possibility of relief entirely. For example, in Brito-Ramirez v.

132 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 64, at 81 (indicating that some detainees stopped
pursuing their claims solely to escape detention); Eagly and Shafer, supra note 76, at 57 (“[A]t
every stage in immigration court proceedings, representation was associated with
dramatically more successful case outcomes for immigrant respondents.”).
133 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 68, 87 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 1–5, 7–15 and accompanying text.
136 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 1, at 5.
137 Id. at 7.
138 Id. at 7–10.
139 See Patel v. Gonzales, No. 06-0702-WS-M, 2007 WL 445463, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8,
2007) (detailing how the immigrant was granted bond after being detained in St. Thomas,
rearrested, taken to a detention center in Alabama, and denied bond by a different IJ).
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Kelly,140 an IJ granted a bond redetermination hearing to an
immigrant detained in Charlotte, North Carolina.141 The day after
the IJ granted the hearing, ICE transferred the detainee to a
different detention center in Charleston, South Carolina.142 The IJ
at the Charlotte facility then denied bond based solely upon the
detainee’s failure to attend the hearing in Charlotte.143
By transferring detainees, ICE also prevents detainees from
utilizing retained counsel to argue for relief on their behalf. For
example, in Maling v. Johnson,144 the detainee retained counsel
while detained in California to challenge his order of removal.145
ICE then transferred the detainee to Alabama, and the detainee
was unable to adequately communicate with counsel representing
him in California.146 ICE can also transfer detainees to take
advantage of favorable substantive law in a jurisdiction. In
Ballesteros v. Ashcroft,147 the immigrant was arrested in Idaho for
possession of a controlled substance.148 This crime would not be
sufficient for removal under Ninth Circuit law if the immigrant
were detained in Idaho, but ICE then transferred him to a detention
center in Colorado.149 There, the IJ applied Tenth Circuit law, under
which the detainee’s prior drug conviction was sufficient to warrant
§ 1226(c) removal.150 ICE can even interfere with proceedings in
federal district courts by transferring detainees. For instance, ICE
has transferred detainees who attempted to file habeas petitions in
federal court from their original place of detention to more rural

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

No. 0:17-463-TMC-PJG, 2017 WL 1363904 (D.S.C. Mar. 17, 2017).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
No. 2:16–cv–1263–JAM–EFB P, 2017 WL 1740636 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2017).
Id. at *2.
Id.
452 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1155.
Id.
Id.
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areas in other jurisdictions.151 Some federal courts have even
recognized such practices as attempts by ICE to forum-shop.152
These examples illustrate the different ways in which ICE can
transfer detainees to obtain the outcomes it prefers in immigration
proceedings. While they do not conclusively establish that ICE has
intended to manipulate the transfer system, these examples show
how such a strategy might be employed.
C. OFFENDING NOTIONS OF JUSTICE

ICE judge shopping offends notions of arbitral neutrality,
fundamental justice, and legal ethics. Specifically, judge shopping
enables ICE, the party that wields disproportionate power in a
proceeding, to use that power to secure a favorable outcome solely
by exerting control over the detainee, the weaker party. While many
of these criticisms may apply to forum shopping generally, the
power relationship between ICE and immigration detainees makes
this a particularly egregious example of such a practice.
“Statistical disparities—especially when there is some
expectation of similarity, such as when courts are construing the
same law or constitution—embarrass the courts.”153 A neutral
arbitrator is central to the United States’ conception of the rule of
law as a blind application of the norms created by legislatures and
courts.154 By permitting one party to circumvent this norm and
secure an advantage that is unrelated to the merits of the dispute,
151 See, e.g., de Jesus Paiva v. Aljets, No. CIV036075 (DWF/AJB), 2003 WL 22888865, at
*1 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2003) (issuing an injunction to prevent ICE from deporting a claimant
from Minnesota to Pennsylvania); Farah v. INS, No. Civ. 02-4725 DSDRLE, 2002 WL
31828309, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 2002) (staying ICE’s removal of petitioner from Minnesota
to Louisiana that prevented his filing of a habeas petition “[b]ecause of the haste with which
he was removed”).
152 See de Jesus Paiva, 2003 WL 22888865, at *4 (“The Court finds that the practical effect
of ICE's decision to transport Petitioners from Minnesota to Pennsylvania was to prevent
them from filing their Petition while they were present in this state. To now hold that
Petitioners may only file their Petition in the state that the ICE determines to send them
would be to allow the ICE to forum shop, intentionally or not.”) (citations omitted); Farah,
2002 WL 31828309, at *3 (“Although the Court refuses to find that the INS intentionally tried
to manipulate jurisdiction in this case, the practical effect of its sudden decision to transport
Farah from Minnesota to Louisiana overnight was to prevent him from filing his Petition
while he was present in this state.”).
153 Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1689 (1990).
154 See id. at 1687–89 (analyzing the “‘sporting theory of justice,’ according to which the
law is a sort of game in which the contestants must surmount the obstacles that chance or
the system impose, with no assistance given to either side”).
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we remove law from the realm of detached judgments and subject it
to a reality of disproportionate power dynamics. ICE forumshopping is an extreme instantiation of this concept because it
permits the powerful party not only to take advantage of a forum,
but also to manufacture a forum by forcibly moving an opposing
party to a different location.
ICE’s use of forum-shopping tactics also implicates the ICE
attorneys who prosecute removal cases in which these tactics are
employed. As representatives of the government, criminal
prosecutors have a responsibility to temper zealous advocacy and
seek justice in pursuing a case.155 ICE attorneys, as representatives
for the government in immigration proceedings, should be seen as
sharing this responsibility in prosecuting removal cases.156 ICE
attorneys and other agency representatives exercise “broad
discretion” in deciding whether and how to prosecute a removal
case.157 In doing so, ICE attorneys should recognize that the
“[d]iscretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces
immediate human concerns.”158
ICE’s duty to consider the interests of justice in deciding whether
to pursue an immigrant’s removal should correspondingly extend to
its decisions on which tactics to employ in the removal process.
ICE’s increasingly common use of forum-shopping tactics to take
advantage of inconsistencies in IJ decision-making would constitute
a departure from that duty. “While our adversarial system may
permit such advocacy by private parties,”159 the use of forumshopping by government agents departs from the goal of seeking
155 See Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89
TUL. L. REV. 1, 21 (2014) (arguing that this prosecutorial duty extends to ICE attorneys as
well); Erin B. Corcoran, Seek Justice, Not Just Deportation: How to Improve Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Law, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 157–60 (2014) (analyzing how
criminal prosecutors’ duties to seek justice affects their use of prosecutorial discretion).
156 See Kang v. Attorney Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the United
States may not use the adversarial tactics of “private parties” in immigration cases, as it “is
duty-bound to ‘cut square corners’ and seek justice rather than victory”); Cade, supra note
155, at 20–21 (arguing that ICE attorneys’ obligation to seek justice is “similar to that of
prosecutors in the criminal system”).
157 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (“A principal feature of the removal
system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. . . . Federal officials, as an
initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.”).
158 Id. (noting that that the “human concerns” include “whether the alien has children born
in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military
service”).
159 Kang, 611 F.3d at 167.
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justice. In an area that unavoidably “embraces immediate human
concerns,”160 advantage-taking by the party which wields nearly
plenary power should be viewed with a skeptical eye and
condemned when it contradicts that party’s fundamental ethical
duty.
V. CONCLUSION
ICE has the authority to transfer immigration detainees to any
facility, with few checks on that power. The location of detention,
especially in isolated, rural areas, has deleterious and outcomedeterminative effects on a detainee’s ability to litigate a removal
case. Additionally, there is a wide variation in IJ decision-making
in removal cases. Because the location of detention determines
which IJ will hear a detainee’s case, ICE can transfer detainees to
facilities with IJs who are statistically more likely to grant ICE’s
preferred form of relief. Thus, ICE effectively has the ability to
forum-shop by transferring detainees to take advantage of
inconsistent IJ decisions and secure favorable outcomes in
immigration cases. This ability to essentially determine the result
of a case independent of the merits departs from ICE’s duty to
pursue justice in removal cases.
While the possibility of ICE’s forum-shopping in prosecuting
removal cases constitutes a serious problem, instituting solutions to
that problem presents an even greater one. Possibilities might
include granting ICE attorneys the authority to control all aspects
of a removal case161 or increasing ICE attorneys’ ability to screen
and decline to prosecute cases.162 These options, however, merely
provide an additional check on forum-shopping; they do not
foreclose use of the tactic. Because the problem of ICE’s forumshopping implicates two of the most fundamental aspects of federal
immigration policy—detainee transfers and non-lifetime IJ
appointments—entirely preventing ICE from forum shopping would
require a comprehensive overhaul of both of these systems.
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396.
See Cade, supra note 155, at 66–68 (arguing that assigning a single attorney to control
the path of the case will give the prosecutor a greater sense of responsibility for his tactics);
Corcoran, supra note 155, at 169 (indicating that an ICE attorney could “serve as the
gatekeeper to determine if removal hearings are appropriate”) (footnote omitted).
162 See Cade, supra note 155, at 70–71 (arguing that the attorneys who will be tasked with
prosecuting a case are in the best position to determine whether to proceed).
160
161
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Unfortunately, such an intensive change in immigration policy is
unlikely. Nonetheless, increasing awareness, especially among the
primary actors in the immigration system, including IJs
themselves, of ICE’s forum-shopping tactics and the outcomedeterminative effect they have on detainees’ cases is a step in the
right direction. In particular, non-ICE actors—such as district court
judges who hear detainees’ habeas cases and immigration attorneys
who defend detainees—should take note of this problem and
emphasize that such departures from justice must never be
permitted in a system that “can affect trade, investment, tourism,
and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as well as the
perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the
full protection of its laws.”163

163

Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395.
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